368
Opinion of the Court
AHTA.12 We accept the parties' suggestions. Although Congress enacted the AHTA because it found unsatisfactory the end result of our Commerce Clause analysis in Evansville—the validation of "head" taxes—Congress specifically permitted, through § 1513(b)'s saving clause, "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other services charges." 13
The formulation in Evansville has been used to determine "reasonableness" in related contexts. See, e. g., American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 289-290 (1987) (applying Evansville test to assess validity under Commerce Clause of state taxes applied to interstate motor carrier); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 466- 467 (1978) (applying Evansville test to determine constitutionality of tax under intergovernmental immunity doctrine). It will suffice for the purpose at hand.14
12 See Brief for Petitioners 20, 22-23; Reply Brief for Petitioners 3-4; Brief for Respondents 32; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-29 (arguing that Evansville reasonableness test is satisfied without explicitly endorsing its application).
13 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, applying Evansville's standards to determine whether airport fees are "reasonable" under § 1513(b) would not permit airports to "impos[e] a modest per passenger fee on airlines as a service charge for use of airport facilities." Post, at 380. Section 1513(a)'s prohibition is written broadly, whereas § 1513(b) is narrow, saving only "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges." A per passenger service charge would be an impermissible "head charge" under § 1513(a), and does not fit into any of the three categories saved by § 1513(b). The user fees challenged here, by contrast, are "rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges," § 1513(b), that would be prohibited as "fee[s]" or "other charge[s]" under § 1513(a), unless they are "reasonable." See supra, at 365-366.
14 It remains open to the Secretary, utilizing his Department's capacity to comprehend the details of airport operations across the country, and the economics of the air transportation industry, to apply some other formula (including one that entails more rigorous scrutiny) for determining whether fees are "reasonable" within the meaning of the AHTA; his exposition will merit judicial approbation so long as it represents "a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984).
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