PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 31 (1994)

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730

PUD NO. 1 OF JEFFERSON CTY. v. WASHINGTON DEPT. OF ECOLOGY

Thomas, J., dissenting

the state court erred when it sustained the stream flow condition under the "use" component of the State's water quality standards without reference to the corresponding "water quality criteria" contained in those standards. As explained above, petitioners' argument with regard to the scope of a State's authority to impose conditions under § 401(d) is correct. I also find petitioners' alternative argument persuasive. Not only does the Court err in rejecting that § 303 argument, in the process of doing so it essentially removes all limitations on a State's conditioning authority under § 401.

The Court states that, "at a minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality standards adopted pursuant to § 303 are 'appropriate' requirements of state law" under § 401(d). Ante, at 713.2 A water quality standard promulgated pursuant to § 303 must "consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses." 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). The Court asserts that this language "is most naturally read to require that a project be consistent with both components, namely, the designated use and the water quality criteria." Ante, at 715. In the Court's view, then, the "use" of a body of water is independently enforceable through § 401(d) without reference to the corresponding criteria. Ibid.

The Court's reading strikes me as contrary to common sense. It is difficult to see how compliance with a "use" of a body of water could be enforced without reference to the

2 In the Court's view, § 303 water quality standards come into play under § 401(d) either as "appropriate" requirements of state law or through § 301 of the Act, which, according to the Court, "incorporates § 303 by reference." Ante, at 713 (citations omitted). The Court notes that through § 303, "the statute allows States to impose limitations to ensure compliance with § 301 of the Act." Ibid. Yet § 301 makes unlawful only "the [unauthorized] discharge of any pollutant by any person." 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added); cf. supra, at 727. Thus, the Court's reliance on § 301 as a source of authority to impose conditions unrelated to discharges is misplaced.

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