728
Thomas, J., dissenting
this reference follows a list of more limited provisions that specifically address discharges, however, the principle ejusdem generis would suggest that the general reference to "appropriate" requirements of state law is most reasonably construed to extend only to provisions that, like the other provisions in the list, impose discharge-related restrictions. Cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 18 (1946) ("Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it"); Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. 73, 84 (1990). In sum, the text and structure of § 401 indicate that a State may impose under § 401(d) only those conditions that are related to discharges.
B
The Court adopts its expansive reading of § 401(d) based at least in part upon deference to the "conclusion" of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that § 401(d) is not limited to requirements relating to discharges. Ante, at 712. The agency regulation to which the Court defers is 40 CFR § 121.2(a)(3) (1993), which provides that the certification shall contain "[a] statement that there is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards." Ante, at 712. According to the Court, "EPA's conclusion that activities—not merely discharges—must comply with state water quality standards . . . is entitled to deference" under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Ante, at 712.
As a preliminary matter, the Court appears to resort to deference under Chevron without establishing through an initial examination of the statute that the text of the section is ambiguous. See Chevron, supra, at 842-843. More importantly, the Court invokes Chevron deference to support its interpretation even though the Government does not seek
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