170
Opinion of Blackmun, J.
Court observed that it is impossible to ignore "the reality, known to the 'reasonable juror,' that, historically, life-term defendants have been eligible for parole." State v. Smith, 298 S. C. 482, 489-490, 381 S. E. 2d 724, 728 (1989) (opinion concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1060 (1990).9
An instruction directing juries that life imprisonment should be understood in its "plain and ordinary" meaning does nothing to dispel the misunderstanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in which any particular State defines "life imprisonment." 10 See Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990) (where there is a "reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence," the defendant is denied due process).
It is true, as the State points out, that the trial court admonished the jury that "you are instructed not to consider parole" and that parole "is not a proper issue for your consideration." App. 146. Far from ensuring that the jury was not misled, however, this instruction actually suggested that parole was available but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact. Undoubtedly, the instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury, given
9 Public opinion and juror surveys support the commonsense understanding that there is a reasonable likelihood of juror confusion about the meaning of the term "life imprisonment." See Paduano & Smith, Deadly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 211, 222-225 (1987); Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1624 (1989); Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1993); Bowers, Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 Law & Society 157, 169- 170 (1993).
10 It almost goes without saying that if the jury in this case understood that the "plain meaning" of "life imprisonment" was life without parole in South Carolina, there would have been no reason for the jury to inquire about petitioner's parole eligibility.
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