Cite as: 512 U. S. 874 (1994)
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
It is true that the terms "standard, practice, or procedure" in § 5 of the Act have been construed to reach districting systems and other potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, see, e. g., Allen, 393 U. S., at 569, and Congress has reenacted § 5 subsequent to our decisions adopting that expansive interpretation. See, e. g., United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U. S. 110, 134-135 (1978); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 533 (1973). Nevertheless, the text of the section suggests precisely the same focus on measures that relate to access to the ballot that appears in § 2. Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance for a change in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. As in § 2, the specific terms in the list of regulated state actions describe only laws that would limit access to the ballot. Moreover, § 5 makes the focus on the individual voter and access to the voting booth even more apparent as the section goes on to state that "no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (emphasis added). This command makes it explicit that in regulating standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting, "Congress was clearly concerned with changes in procedure with which
to suggest that the disclaimer in § 2(b) was intended solely to prohibit the use of such a system. Such a device has never, to my knowledge, been proposed in any voting rights case. Moreover, to the extent that the decisions in White and Whitcomb can inform our understanding of § 2(b), they suggest that in expressing a concern that "proportionality" not be used as the measure of a voting rights violation, Congress was concerned with proportional electoral power, not merely proportional election of minority candidates. See, e. g., Whitcomb, 403 U. S., at 153 (rejecting the "failure of [the minority group] to have legislative seats in proportion to its population" as a sufficient basis for a claim) (emphasis added). The proviso has been understood in the past simply as a disclaimer of a right to proportional representation, see, e. g., Gingles, 478 U. S., at 84-86, 94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), and I think that understanding is correct.
929
Page: Index Previous 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007