Cite as: 512 U. S. 874 (1994)
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
B
From the foregoing, it should be clear that, as far as the text of the Voting Rights Act is concerned, "§ 2 does not speak in terms of 'vote dilution.' " Gingles, 478 U. S., at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). One might wonder, then, why we have consistently concluded that "[w]e know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2." Id., at 84. The juxtaposition of the two statements surely makes the result in our cases appear extraordinary, since it suggests a sort of statutory construction through divination that has allowed us to determine that Congress "really meant" to enact a statute about vote dilution even though Congress did not do so explicitly. In truth, our method of construing § 2 has been only little better than that, for the only source we have relied upon for the expansive meaning we have given § 2 has been the legislative history of the Act.
We first considered the amended § 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles. Although the precise scope of the terms "standard, practice, or procedure" was not specifically addressed in that case, Gingles nevertheless established our current interpretation of the amended section as a provision that addresses vote dilution, and in particular it fixed our understanding that the results test in § 2(b) is intended to measure vote dilution in terms of electoral outcomes. See id., at 93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that Gingles made electoral results the "linchpin" of vote dilution claims). In reaching its interpretation of § 2, the Gingles Court re-differences in the application of §§ 2 and 5 that Justice Kennedy points out, see ante, at 883-884, would not, in my view, suggest as an original matter that the same terms in the two sections should be read to have different meanings, Justice Kennedy's observations might suggest that different considerations would have a bearing on the question whether our past interpretations should be abandoned in the § 5 and § 2 contexts. Indeed, in the § 5 context they might suggest a contrary conclusion to the result I reach under § 2. See infra, at 936-945. That, however, is a question for another day.
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