542
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
outlines in some detail what it conceives to be the equities of respondent's situation—a factor not usually of great significance in construing the Internal Revenue Code. I believe that the Court's picture of the equities is misleadingly inaccurate, and that its effort to stretch the law to avoid these perceived inequities is quite contrary to established doctrine.
The legal question at hand is whether the Government has waived its sovereign immunity in 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) to authorize respondent, who conceded that she "is not the taxpayer," App. 16, to file a refund suit. In answering that question, it must be remembered that § 1346(a)(1) is "a jurisdictional provision which is a keystone in a carefully articulated and quite complicated structure of tax laws." Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 157 (1960). Section "1346(a)(1) must be read in conformity with other statutory provisions [26 U. S. C. §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a)] which qualify a taxpayer's right to bring a refund suit." United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 601-602 (1990).
Section 1346(a)(1) provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of:
"(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws." 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988 ed. and Supp V).
The jurisdiction conferred by § 1346(a)(1) is limited by 26 U. S. C. § 7422(a). Like § 1346(a)(1), § 7422(a) contains no language limiting a refund suit to the "taxpayer," but its "express language . . . conditions a district court's authority
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