Cite as: 515 U. S. 593 (1995)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
interceptions that could actually be made pursuant to present or pending authorization.
As the Court notes in response to this opinion, see ibid., under its reading the third clause serves to define the actus reus element of the crime, just as Congress could have done by replacing the phrase "notice of the possible interception" with the unambiguous phrase "notice of such authorization or application." That unambiguous language, however, would not achieve the temporal limitation on liability that I believe Congress intended to achieve with the words "possible interception." The Court appears to acknowledge the need for such a limitation. See ante, at 604-605, n. 3. Rather than recognizing the limitation the statute contains, however, the Court hints that it might in some future case invent one. Limiting liability to the time before the authorizing judge announces the wiretap may well be "plausible," ibid., but no plausible basis exists for finding that limitation in the words of the statute. A wiser course than judicial legislation, I submit, is simply to adopt a literal, reasonable construction of the text that Congress drafted.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join all but Part I and the last paragraph of Part II of the Court's opinion. I would reverse the Court of Appeals, and would uphold respondent's conviction, on the count charging violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1503.
I
The "omnibus clause" of § 1503, under which respondent was charged, provides:
"Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, ob-
609
Page: Index Previous 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007