Cite as: 515 U. S. 593 (1995)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 816 (1993). Thus, § 1503 reaches only purposeful efforts to obstruct the due administration of justice, i. e., acts performed with that very object in mind. See, e. g., United States v. Mullins, 22 F. 3d 1365, 1370 (CA6 1994); United States v. Ryan, 455 F. 2d 728, 734 (CA9 1972). This limitation was clearly set forth in our first decision construing § 1503's predecessor statute, Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893), which held an indictment insufficient because it had failed to allege the intent to obstruct justice. That opinion rejected the Government's contention that the intent required to violate the statute could be found in "the intent to commit an unlawful act, in the doing of which justice was in fact obstructed"; to justify a conviction, it said, "the specific intent to violate the statute must exist." Id., at 207. Pettibone did acknowledge, however—and here is the point that is distorted to produce today's opinion—that the specific intent to obstruct justice could be found where the defendant intentionally committed a wrongful act that had obstruction of justice as its "natural and probable consequence." Ibid.
Today's "nexus" requirement sounds like this, but is in reality quite different. Instead of reaffirming that "natural and probable consequence" is one way of establishing intent, it substitutes " ' "natural and probable effect" ' " for intent, requiring that factor even when intent to obstruct justice is otherwise clear. See ante, at 599, quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F. 3d 692, 695 (CA10 1993), which in turn quotes United States v. Thomas, 916 F. 2d 647, 651 (CA11 1990).2
2 Thomas, which appears to be the origin of this doctrine, made precisely the same mistake the Court does. It cited and misapplied earlier Court of Appeals cases standing for the entirely different principle—flowing from our language in Pettibone—that to prove an "endeavor" to obstruct justice, "all the government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his scheme would [obstruct the due administration of justice]." United States v. Silverman, 745 F. 2d 1386, 1393 (CA11 1984). See also United States v. Fields, 838 F. 2d 1571, 1573 (CA11 1988). This
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