Cite as: 515 U. S. 50 (1995)
Ginsburg, J., concurring
biguous' for purposes of lenity merely because" there is "a division of judicial authority" over its proper construction. Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990). The rule of lenity applies only if, "after seizing everything from which aid can be derived," Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), we can make "no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). That is not this case.
We hold that the time respondent spent at the Volunteers of America community treatment center while "released" on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not "official detention" within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b). Respondent therefore was not entitled to a credit against his sentence of imprisonment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
As the Government reads 18 U. S. C. § 3585(b), Koray gains credit against his sentence for the two months he spent in jail, but not for the five months' close confinement he encountered at the halfway house. The Court cogently explains why it adopts the Government's interpretation. I write separately to point out that Koray has not argued before us that he did not elect bail intelligently, i. e., with comprehension that time in the halfway house, unlike time in jail, would yield no credit against his eventual sentence. The Court thus does not foreclose the possibility that the fundamental fairness we describe as "due process" calls for notice and a comprehension check. Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 (setting out information a court is to convey to assure that a defendant who pleads guilty understands the consequences of the plea).
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