Cite as: 515 U. S. 50 (1995)
Stevens, J., dissenting
(CA10 1975) ("released on personal recognizance"); United States v. Peterson, 507 F. 2d 1191, 1192 (CADC 1974) (defendant "at large on conditional release"). Moreover, at least one Court of Appeals (albeit after the passage of the Bail Reform Act) interpreted the word "custody" under § 3568 as including "enforced residence under conditions approaching those of incarceration." Brown v. Rison, 895 F. 2d 533, 536 (CA9 1990). Thus, though I agree with the majority that Congress intended to incorporate the understanding of "custody" that existed under § 3568, I fail to see how that intention supports the majority's result.
Simply accepting the plain meaning of the statutory text would avoid the anomalies created by the Court's opinion, would effectuate the intent of Congress, and would provide fair treatment for defendants who will otherwise spend more time in custody than Congress has deemed necessary or appropriate. For these reasons, I agree with the persuasive opinion of the Court of Appeals and would affirm its judgment.
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