Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 33 (1995)

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930

MILLER v. JOHNSON

Stevens, J., dissenting

voters in Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District. The Court's conclusion that they have standing to maintain a Shaw claim appears to rest on a theory that their placement in the Eleventh District caused them " 'representational harms.' " Hays, ante, at 744, cited ante, at 909. The Shaw Court explained the concept of "representational harms" as follows: "When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole." Shaw, 509 U. S., at 648. Although the Shaw Court attributed representational harms solely to a message sent by the legislature's action, those harms can only come about if the message is received—that is, first, if all or most black voters support the same candidate, and, second, if the successful candidate ignores the interests of her white constituents. Appellees' standing, in other words, ultimately depends on the very premise the Court purports to abhor: that voters of a particular race " 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.' " Ante, at 912 (quoting Shaw, 509 U. S., at 647). This generalization, as the Court recognizes, is "offensive and demeaning." Ante, at 912.

In particular instances, of course, members of one race may vote by an overwhelming margin for one candidate, and in some cases that candidate will be of the same race. "Racially polarized voting" is one of the circumstances plaintiffs must prove to advance a vote dilution claim. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 56-58 (1986). Such a claim allows voters to allege that gerrymandered district lines have impaired their ability to elect a candidate of their own race. The Court emphasizes, however, that a so-called Shaw claim is " 'analytically distinct' from a vote dilution claim," ante, at 911 (quoting Shaw, 509 U. S., at 652). Neither in Shaw, nor in Hays, nor in the instant cases has the Court answered the

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