Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 35 (1995)

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932

MILLER v. JOHNSON

Stevens, J., dissenting

from joining whites in the activities at issue. The districting plan here, in contrast, serves the interest in diversity and tolerance by increasing the likelihood that a meaningful number of black representatives will add their voices to legislative debates. See post, at 947-948 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, ante, at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Adarand, ante, at 247-248, n. 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That racial integration of the sort attempted by Georgia now appears more vulnerable to judicial challenge than some policies alleged to perpetuate racial bias, cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), is anomalous, to say the least.

Equally distressing is the Court's equation of traditional gerrymanders, designed to maintain or enhance a dominant group's power, with a dominant group's decision to share its power with a previously underrepresented group. In my view, districting plans violate the Equal Protection Clause when they "serve no purpose other than to favor one segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political—that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). In contrast, I do not see how a districting plan that favors a politically weak group can violate equal protection. The Constitution does not mandate any form of proportional representation, but it certainly permits a State to adopt a policy that promotes fair representation of different groups. Indeed, this Court squarely so held in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973):

"[N]either we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise

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