Cite as: 516 U. S. 235 (1996)
Thomas, J., dissenting
the applicable look-back period in this case is two years, measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Accordingly, we find that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund of his overwithheld taxes. The judgment is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Justice Thomas has cogently explained why the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. I therefore join his opinion. Because one point warrants further emphasis, I add this additional comment. In my view the Commissioner's position, and that of the majority, misses the forest by focusing on the trees. The predecessor to 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b) was amended to protect the interests of a taxpayer who receives a notice of deficiency from the IRS and later determines that the asserted underpayment was in fact an overpayment. Post, at 261-262. Congress expressly intended to guard against the possibility that the time for claiming a refund might lapse before the taxpayer in these circumstances realizes that he is entitled to claim a refund. As Justice Thomas has demonstrated, there is no need to read § 6512(b)(3)(B)—a provision designed to benefit the taxpayer who receives an unexpected deficiency notice— as giving the IRS an arbitrary right to shorten the taxpayer's period for claiming a refund if that taxpayer has not yet filed a return. The Court's reading of the statute converts an intended benefit into a handicap.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.
Under the Internal Revenue Service's longstanding interpretation of 26 U. S. C. §§ 6511(a) and (b), Lundy would have collected a refund if he had filed suit in district court. The majority assumes, and I am prepared to hold, that that interpretation of § 6511 is correct. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) in-
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