1012
Stevens, J., dissenting
contiguity, [and] respect for political subdivisions . . . to racial considerations." Id., at 916; see also id., at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (strict scrutiny should be applied only if State emphasized race in "substantial disregard" for traditional districting principles); ante, at 962 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
Of course, determining the "predominant" motive of the Texas Legislature, ante, at 959 (citing Miller, 515 U. S., at 916), is not a simple matter.9 The members of that body
9 Because the Court's approach to cases of this kind seeks to identify the "predominant" motive of the legislature, it is worth pointing out, as we have on so many prior occasions, that it is often "difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971). As in every other legislative body, each of the members of Texas' Legislature has his or her own agenda and interests—particularly in the "complicated process" of redistricting, in which every decision "inevitably has sharp political impact." White v. Weiser, 412 U. S. 783, 795- 796 (1973). In these circumstances, "[r]arely can it be said that a legislature . . . operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. In fact, it is because legislators . . . are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977) (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 636-639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Shaw II, ante, at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Not only is this a case in which a legislature is operating under a "broad mandate," but other factors weigh in favor of deference as well. First, the inherently political process of redistricting is as much at the core of state sovereignty as any other. Second, the "motive" with which we are concerned is not per se impermissible. (For that reason, this litigation is very different from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), in which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's action was motivated by an intent to harm individuals because of their status as members of a particular group. Where there is "proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision," the "judicial deference" due to the legislative process is no longer justified. Id., at 265-
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