1018
Stevens, J., dissenting
ably support their opponents. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753 (1973) ("[W]hen [political profiles are] over-laid on a census map, it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another").17
The careful gerrymandering conducted by the Texas Legislature under the watchful eye of Johnson and her staff was a success not only on a districtwide level (Johnson was elected with over 70% of the vote in both 1992 and 1994), but on a precinct level. While the pre-1990 precincts in the heavily Republican North Dallas gave little reason for a Democratic incumbent to hope for much support, see State's Exh. 9B (maps of Dallas and Collin Counties with 1990 election index results showing only a few Democrat-leaning precincts in North Dallas), the gerrymandering that occurred in 1991 resulted in smaller precincts that, by all indications, gathered concentrations of Democratic voters into District 30 while leaving concentrations of Republican voters in surrounding Districts 3 and 26. See State's Exh. 9A (maps of Dallas and Collin Counties with 1992 election index results showing many more Democrat-leaning precincts in the North Dallas sections of District 30).
Presumably relying on Shaw I 's statement that "a reap-portionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e] . . . voters' on the basis of race," 509
17 Incumbents influenced the shape of districts in other ways. Both District 30 and District 29, for instance, detoured to include portions of the state legislative districts that were being represented by the state legislators who hoped to run for Congress. See, e. g., State's Exh. 31 (showing that portion of Tarrant County included in District 30 had been part of Johnson's State Senate district). In some cases, legislators drew districts to avoid the residences of potential primary challengers. See 3 Tr. 192- 193; 4 id., at 46. Incumbents also sought to include communities that they expected (or knew) to contain particularly active supporters; this interest in "active" voters often trumped any desire to ensure a particular racial makeup. See 3 id., at 190; 4 id., at 40-41; 861 F. Supp., at 1320.
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