Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 73 (1996)

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258

MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA.

Thomas, J., dissenting

In light of the plain meaning of the phrase "State or political subdivision," I see no reason to defer to the Attorney General's regulation interpreting that statute to cover political parties. See 28 CFR § 51.7 (1995). Though the Party has not challenged the validity of the regulation, it hardly follows that this Court is bound to accept it as authoritative. We defer to the Attorney General on statutory matters within her authority "only if Congress has not expressed its intent with respect to the question, and then only if the administrative interpretation is reasonable." Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491, 508 (1992). As explained, § 5 on its face resolves the question whether political parties are subject to the preclearance rule of § 5: A political party is simply not a "State," regardless of the particular activity in which it might be engaging. Congress has conveyed its intent to limit § 5 to the States themselves and their political subdivisions. Accordingly, the regulation warrants no judicial deference. Cf. id., at 508-509 (declining to defer to Attorney General's construction of § 5).4

My reading of § 5 is squarely supported by our only precedent on the applicability of § 5 to political parties, Williams v. Democratic Party of Georgia, Civ. Action No. 16286 (ND Ga., Apr. 6, 1972), aff'd, 409 U. S. 809 (1972). Williams held, as a matter of "statutory construction," Civ. Action No. 16286, at 5, that § 5 does not apply to political parties. The District Court stated that "[t]he Act does not refer to actions by political parties but refers to actions by a 'State or political subdivision.'" Id., at 4. Though the District Court be-4 Justice Stevens contends that the foregoing discussion is "surprising because [his] explanation of why § 5 applies to political parties places no reliance on principles of administrative deference." Ante, at 222. By presupposing that the regulation is a valid interpretation of § 5, however, Justice Stevens simply assumes that § 5 could cover political parties. Thus, he does not just defer to the Attorney General's reading of § 5, but displaces § 5 with the regulation. Cf. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, supra, at 508 ("Deference does not mean acquiescence"). For the reasons given above, I would not do the same.

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