Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996)
Thomas, J., dissenting
222-223, n. 35. We did not take this case to review the District Court's application of the regulation based on the facts of this case, but to decide whether "[§ ]5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 require[s] preclearance of a political party's decision . . . to impose" a fee on conventiongoers. Juris. Statement i. Consequently, appellants and the Government argued that the Party was covered as a "State" under § 5, see n. 7, infra, and the Party maintained that § 5 "requires action by a State or political subdivision." Brief for Appellees 29. See also id., at 30 ("A political party is not a subdivision or instrumentality of the government [under Sheffield]"). Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer address the question presented, however, only in the course of dismissing the dissents' arguments, and after they reach their respective conclusions.
Furthermore, the tactical or legal error of a litigant cannot define the meaning of a federal statute. See generally Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968). Our duty is to read the statute for ourselves. While the regulation may "unambiguously provid[e] that . . . a political party" must preclear, ante, at 194 (opinion of Stevens, J.), the statute does nothing of the sort, regardless of any submission by the Party. Accordingly, I would decide this case on the ground that the Republican Party of Virginia is not a "State" in the ordinary sense of the word. Its rules and policies should therefore not be subject to § 5.6
6 Justice Stevens rejects this reading of § 5 as being "at war with the intent of Congress and with our settled interpretation of the Act." Ante, at 220. First, as explained supra, at 256-258, and n. 3, 258-261, there is no precedent for the application of § 5 to nongovernmental units; the issue is anything but "settled." Justice Stevens errs when he states that "[t]he operative test, we have stated repeatedly, is whether a political party exercises power over the electoral process." Ante, at 218. We have never made any such statement, because we have never before addressed the question whether political parties are subject to § 5. Second, Justice Stevens cites only legislative history as evidence of Congress' "unambiguously expressed . . . purpose" that § 5 should apply to the "candidate selection process." Ante, at 224. Section 5, of course, could apply in
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