Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 81 (1996)

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266

MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA.

Thomas, J., dissenting

The Voting Rights Act does, in fact, contain precisely such language in a different section. "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 11(a) of the Act provides that "[n]o person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of [the Voting Rights Act and supplemental provisions] or is otherwise qualified to vote, or willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such person's vote." 42 U. S. C. § 1973i(a) (emphasis added). See also § 1973i(b) ("No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote") (emphasis added). These provisions of the Act account for the very possibility that seems to motivate the Court's strained interpretation of § 5: that persons acting individually or as part of a group, as opposed to States or political subdivisions through their governmental bodies, will interfere with the right to vote.

I would not, therefore, accept the proposition that the constitutional doctrine of state action defines the breadth of the statutory term "State." Given the clarity of the word "State," together with the facts that Congress has traditionally encompassed the broad category of state action by using the phrase "under color of law," and has done so in other parts of this very Act, it is evident that Congress did not mean to incorporate state-action doctrine in § 5.

3

Even indulging the argument that § 5's coverage extends to all activity that qualifies as state action for constitutional purposes, the Court's further assumption that the actions of

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