Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 82 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996)

Thomas, J., dissenting

the Party in this case are fairly attributable to the State is irreconcilable with our state-action precedents.9

Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer are correct to suggest that, under the White Primary Cases—most notably Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953)—political parties may sometimes be characterized as state actors. Where they err, however, is in failing to recognize that the state-action principle of those cases "does not reach to all forms of private political activity." Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 158 (1978). Rather, it "encompasses only state-regulated elections or elections conducted by organizations which in practice produce 'the uncontested choice of public officials.' " Ibid. (quoting Terry, supra, at 484 (Clark, J., concurring)). Thus, the White Primary Cases do not stand for the categorical rule that political parties are state actors, but only for the proposition that, in limited factual circumstances, a particular political party may be deemed an agent of the State.

This case is not governed by the state-action principle enunciated in either Smith or Terry. Unlike the primary in Smith, the Republican Party of Virginia's convention was not a " 'state-regulated electio[n]' " to which the doctrine of state action extends. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 158. As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that Smith is on its face limited to primary elections. That is, Smith requires a sufficient degree of state regulation that "the party which is required to follow these legislative directions [is made] an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election." 321 U. S., at 663

9 Although Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer never expressly acknowledge their reliance on state-action theory, each finds it necessary to look to that case law for support. See ante, at 199-200, 210-219, 221; ante, at 235-237. Indeed, Justice Stevens' discussion of whether the Party acted under the Commonwealth of Virginia's authority in holding the convention is virtually indistinguishable from state-action analysis. See ante, at 194-200.

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