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Thomas, J., dissenting
the costs of the convention.11 Second, it simply cannot be maintained that exclusion from the Party's 1994 convention was tantamount to exclusion from the general election. The fact that the Party's 1994 nominee for the United States Senate lost the general election is proof enough that the modern-day Republican Party in Virginia does not have the stranglehold on the political process that the Democratic Party of Texas had in the 1940's.12 In short, this case is a far cry from Terry, and it does not fall within the bounds of state action delineated, albeit none too clearly, by Terry.13
In any event, subsequent decisions of this Court have "carefully defined" the scope of Smith and Terry. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S., at 158. As we have refined
11 It is true, as Justice Stevens states, that potential for discrimination is the prevailing test for preclearance under § 5. See ante, at 216-217, and n. 29. But that is a different question from whether the Party's conduct rises to the level of state action under Terry, the issue I address here.
12 Justice Stevens claims that, under United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), "[v]oting at the nomination stage is protected regardless of whether it 'invariably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate choice of the representative.' " Ante, at 218. Classic did not so hold. Even assuming that Classic applies to conventions as well as primaries, that case merely stated, in dicta, that "where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery," 313 U. S., at 318, the right to participate in a primary does not turn upon the dispositive nature of the primary. Party nominating conventions in Virginia have not been merged by law with the election machinery of the State. See supra, at 269 and this page. Contrary to what Justice Stevens says, ante, at 218-219, n. 31, the petition procedure at issue in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), was by law made a part of the State's electoral system: It was expressly mandated by state statute. See id., at 815 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 10-3 (1967)).
13 In light of Smith and Terry, Justice Breyer concludes that the word "State" does not "automatically place a party's all-white evasive maneuvers beyond [§ 5's] reach." Ante, at 237 (emphasis deleted). That, however, is not this case. As discussed above, there is no basis in fact for inferring that the Party charged the fee as a strategy for producing an " 'all-white' convention process" or as a method of evading the Constitution. Ibid. And the record in no way suggests that the three law students challenging the fee are black.
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