Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 77 (1996)

Page:   Index   Previous  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  Next

262

MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA.

Thomas, J., dissenting

quire all "established" political parties, ante, at 219, in designated States to preclear all changes " 'affecting voting,' " ante, at 227. See also ante, at 238 (Breyer, J.) (suggesting that political groups that receive state-law preferences in access to, and placement on, the ballot must preclear "voting-related" changes). As the Solicitor General candidly acknowledged, an "affecting-voting" or "voting-related" rule cannot be limited to practices administered at conventions; it logically extends to practices at all local mass meetings that precede conventions. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 11. And almost all activity that occurs at a nominating convention theoretically affects voting; indeed, Justice Stevens is unable to articulate any principled dividing line between that which does and does not relate to voting at a convention. See ante, at 227. Thus, today's decision will increase exponentially the number of preclearance requests, for even the most innocuous changes, that the Attorney General must process within a statutorily limited amount of time. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (60 days). "[I]t is certainly reasonable to believe that Congress, having placed a strict time limit on the Attorney General's consideration of submissions, also deliberately placed a limit on the number and importance of the submissions themselves. This result was achieved by restricting the reach of § 5 to enactments of either the States themselves or their political subdivisions." Sheffield, supra, at 148 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That the inclusion of political parties under § 5 de-means the preclearance regime and so drastically increases its scope substantially undermines the possibility that Congress intended parties to preclear.

Without so much as a nod to the explicit "State or political subdivision" limitation in § 5, Justice Stevens substitutes the administrative regulation as the analytical starting point in this case. See ante, at 194-195. He apparently does so because the Party failed to challenge the regulation and its counsel stated at oral argument that § 5 could sometimes encompass political parties. See ante, at 194-195, 220, n. 32,

Page:   Index   Previous  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007