128
Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
the parties' will or based on changed circumstances, termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State "to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship." Rivera, 483 U. S., at 580. Our Lassiter and Santosky decisions, recognizing that parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action, Santosky, 455 U. S., at 759, have not served as precedent in other areas. See supra, at 118, n. 11. We are therefore satisfied that the label "civil" should not entice us to leave undisturbed the Mississippi courts' disposition of this case. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S., at 50.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we hold that Mississippi may not withhold from M. L. B. "a 'record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims." Mayer, 404 U. S., at 198. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment.
The Court gives a most careful and comprehensive recitation of the precedents from Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), through Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971), and beyond, a line of decisions which invokes both equal protection and due process principles. The duality, as the Court notes, stems from Griffin itself, which produced no opinion for the Court and invoked strands of both constitutional doctrines.
In my view the cases most on point, and the ones which persuade me we must reverse the judgment now reviewed, are the decisions addressing procedures involving the rights and privileges inherent in family and personal relations.
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