M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 29 (1996)

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130

M. L. B. v. S. L. J.

Thomas, J., dissenting

effectively restricted to this case. The inevitable consequence will be greater demands on the States to provide free assistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases involving interests that cannot, based on the test established by the majority, be distinguished from the admittedly important interest at issue here. The cases on which the majority relies, primarily cases requiring appellate assistance for indi-gent criminal defendants, were questionable when decided, and have, in my view, been undermined since. Even accepting those cases, however, I am of the view that the majority takes them too far. I therefore dissent.

I

Petitioner requests relief under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, though she does not specify how either Clause affords it. The majority accedes to petitioner's request. But, carrying forward the ambiguity in the cases on which it relies, the majority does not specify the source of the relief it grants. Those decisions are said to "reflect both equal protection and due process concerns." Ante, at 120. And, while we are told that "cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis,' " ibid. (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 666 (1983)), the majority nonetheless acknowledges that " '[m]ost decisions in this area . . . res[t] on an equal protection framework,' " ante, at 120 (quoting Bearden, supra, at 665). It then purports to "place this case within the framework established by our past decisions in this area." Ante, at 120. It is not clear to me whether the majority disavows any due process support for its holding. (Despite the murky disclaimer, the majority discusses numerous cases that squarely relied on due process considerations.) I therefore analyze petitioner's claim under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. If neither Clause affords petitioner the right to a free, civil-appeal transcript, I assume that no amalgam of the two does.

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