Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996)
Thomas, J., dissenting
ated" appeal—an appeal that neither petitioner nor the majority claims Mississippi is required to provide—to overturn the determination that resulted from that hearing. I see no principled difference between a facially neutral rule that serves in some cases to prevent persons from availing themselves of state employment, or a state-funded education, or a state-funded abortion—each of which the State may, but is not required to, provide—and a facially neutral rule that prevents a person from taking an appeal that is available only because the State chooses to provide it.
Nor does Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), a case decided six years earlier, operate to limit Washington v. Davis. Williams was yet another manifestation of the "equalizing" notion of equal protection that this Court began to question in Davis. See Williams, supra, at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). To the extent its reasoning survives Davis, I think that Williams is distinguishable. Petitioner Williams was incarcerated beyond the maximum statutory sentence because he was unable to pay the fine imposed as part of his sentence. We found the law that permitted prisoners to avoid extrastatutory imprisonment only by paying their fines to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Even though it was " 'nondiscriminatory on its face,' " the law "work[ed] an invidious discrimination" as to Williams and all other indigents because they could not afford to pay their fines. 399 U. S., at 242. The majority concludes that the sanctions involved in Williams are analogous to "the Mississippi prescription here at issue," in that both do not have merely a disparate impact, "they apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class." Ante, at 127. Even assuming that Williams' imprisonment gave rise to an equal protection violation, however, M. L. B.'s circumstances are not comparable. M. L. B.'s parental rights were terminated—the analog to Williams' extended imprisonment—because the Chancery Court found, after a hearing, that she was unfit to remain her children's mother, not because she was indigent. Her indigency only prevented her from tak-
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