142
Thomas, J., dissenting
enough leap to mind. Will the Court, for example, now extend the right to a free transcript to an indigent seeking to appeal the outcome of a paternity suit? 3 To those who wish to appeal custody determinations? 4 How about persons against whom divorce decrees are entered? 5 Civil suits that arise out of challenges to zoning ordinances with an impact on families? 6 Why not foreclosure actions—or at least fore-3 In Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1 (1981), we held that the Due Process Clause required the States to provide a free blood grouping test to an indigent defendant in a paternity action. The Court observed that "[a]part from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection. Just as the termination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, so too does their imposition." Id., at 13 (citations omitted). Little's description of the interest at stake in a paternity suit seems to place it on par with the interest here.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 58 (1981), recognized as much: "I deem it not a little ironic that the Court on this very day grants, on due process grounds, an indigent putative father's claim for state-paid blood grouping tests in the interest of according him a meaningful opportunity to disprove his paternity, Little v. Streater, [supra,] but in the present case rejects, on due process grounds, an indigent mother's claim for state-paid legal assistance when the State seeks to take her own child away from her in a termination proceeding." (Emphasis deleted.)
As the majority indicates, ante, at 118, n. 11, we have distinguished— in my view unpersuasively—between the requirements of due process in paternity suits and in termination suits. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U. S. 574 (1987). Whether we will distinguish between paternity appellants and misdemeanor appellants remains to be seen.
4 See, e. g., Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F. 3d 1011, 1013-1014 (CA8 1996) (father's "fundamental" "liberty interest in the care, custody and management of his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree and Nebraska law").
5 In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), we referred to a divorce as the "adjustment of a fundamental human relationship." Id., at 382-383.
6 See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977).
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