Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996)
Thomas, J., dissenting
These are Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18 (1981); and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (1982), all cases resting exclusively upon the Due Process Clause. Here, due process is quite a sufficient basis for our holding.
I acknowledge the authorities do not hold that an appeal is required, even in a criminal case; but given the existing appellate structure in Mississippi, the realities of the litigation process, and the fundamental interests at stake in this particular proceeding, the State may not erect a bar in the form of transcript and filing costs beyond this petitioner's means. The Court well describes the fundamental interests the petitioner has in ensuring that the order which terminated all her parental ties was based upon a fair assessment of the facts and the law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). With these observations, I concur in the judgment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting.
I join all but Part II of Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion. For the reasons stated in that opinion, I would not extend the Griffin-Mayer line of cases to invalidate Mississippi's refusal to pay for petitioner's transcript on appeal in this case.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, and with whom The Chief Justice joins except as to Part II, dissenting.
Today the majority holds that the Fourteenth Amendment requires Mississippi to afford petitioner a free transcript because her civil case involves a "fundamental" right. The majority seeks to limit the reach of its holding to the type of case we confront here, one involving the termination of parental rights. I do not think, however, that the new-found constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals can be
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