Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 2 (1997)

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940

HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Syllabus

amendment has a retroactive effect, then it will not apply to the conduct alleged here, which occurred before its effective date. P. 946. (b) Schumer's contention that the 1986 amendment lacks retroactive effect is rejected. His argument that the amendment does not impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed because it has been unlawful to knowingly submit a false claim to the United States since 1863 was made, and rejected, in Landgraf. 511 U. S., at 281-282. He is also mistaken in contending that the amendment does not change the substance of the extant cause of action. By eliminating a defense to a qui tam suit—prior disclosure to the Government—the amendment attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Id., at 269. Nor is it the case that the amendment does not create a new cause of action. As Schumer himself recognizes, it extended an FCA cause to private parties in circumstances where the action was previously foreclosed. This extension is not insignificant. Qui tam relators are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good and, thus, are less likely than is the Government to forgo an action involving a technical violation but no harm to the public fisc. The amendment essentially creates a new cause of action, not just an increased likelihood that an existing cause of action will be pursued. See, e. g., Winfree v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 227 U. S. 296, 302. Before the amendment, Schumer's action was completely barred because of Hughes' disclosure. The amendment would revive that action, subjecting Hughes to previously foreclosed qui tam litigation. Finally, Schumer errs in contending that the amendment is jurisdictional and, hence, an exception to the general Landgraf presumption against retroactivity. Statutes merely addressing where a suit may be brought may not meet the conditions for the Landgraf presumption, for they regulate only the secondary conduct of the litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of the parties. However, the amendment speaks to the parties' substantive rights by creating jurisdiction where none previously existed; it is therefore subject to the presumption against retroactivity. Pp. 946-952. 63 F. 3d 1512, vacated and remanded.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Kenneth W. Starr argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Christopher Landau, John J. Higgins, John T. Kuelbs, and Daniel R. Allemeier.

Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were David Silberman and Leon Dayan.

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