Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 10 (1997)

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948

HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court

before" its effective date. 511 U. S., at 281-282; see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 303 (1994) (holding that an increase in monetary liability could not be applied retroactively even though the "normative scope of Title VII's prohibition on workplace discrimination" was not altered).

Respondent next contends that "the 1986 Amendments to the qui tam bar do not create a new cause of action where there was none before, change the substance of the extant cause of action, or alter a defendant's exposure for a false claim by even a single penny [and] thus d[o] not 'increase a party's liability for past conduct.' " Brief for Respondent 15 (quoting Landgraf, supra, at 280). See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13-14. Again, respondent is mistaken. While we acknowledge that the monetary liability faced by an FCA defendant is the same whether the action is brought by the Government or by a qui tam relator, the 1986 amendment eliminates a defense to a qui tam suit— prior disclosure to the Government—and therefore changes the substance of the existing cause of action for qui tam defendants by " 'attach[ing] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.' " Landgraf, supra, at 269 (quoting Wheeler, supra, at 767); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14, n. 6 ("[P]roof that the government had the information when suit was brought was . . . a jurisdictional defense to an action brought by a qui tam relator" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 49 (1990) ("A law that abolishes an affirmative defense" violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 169-170 (1925) ("[A]ny statute . . . which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto").

Nor is it the case that the 1986 amendment does not "create a new cause of action." As respondent himself recognizes, "as a result of the 1986 Amendments, the federal

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