Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 8 (1997)

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946

HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SCHUMER Opinion of the Court

Congress amended the FCA in 1986, however, to permit qui tam suits based on information in the Government's possession, except where the suit was based on information that had been publicly disclosed and was not brought by an original source of the information. See 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4) (A). Because the 1986 amendment became effective before this suit was commenced, respondent contends that it, rather than the 1982 qui tam provision, controls. We disagree.

We have frequently noted, and just recently reaffirmed, that there is a "presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). "The 'principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.' " Ibid. (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Accordingly, we apply this time-honored presumption unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to the contrary. 511 U. S., at 268.

Nothing in the 1986 amendment evidences a clear intent by Congress that it be applied retroactively, and no one suggests otherwise. Thus, under the analysis the Court adopted in Landgraf, if the 1986 amendment has a retroactive effect, then we presume it will not apply to the conduct alleged in this case, which occurred prior to its effective date.4

Respondent argues that the 1986 amendment has no retroactive effect because it does not fit within Justice Story's "influential definition" of impermissibly retroactive legislation, which we quoted with approval in Landgraf:

4 Because both the allegedly false claim submission and the disclosure to the Government of information about that submission occurred prior to the effective date of the 1986 amendments, we need not address which of these two events constitutes the relevant conduct for purposes of our retroactivity analysis.

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