206
Opinion of the Court
III
Although we have rejected the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the limitations period commenced on the date of withdrawal, that holding alone does not resolve the limitations issue in this case. The Fund filed its complaint on February 9, 1993. That date was more than six years after Ferbar missed its first payment (which the Fund had set for February 1, 1987), but within six years of the dates scheduled for the second and succeeding payments. Because suit was instituted more than six years after the due date of the first payment, the District Court alternatively held that the action was time barred in its entirety. See supra, at 199.
The District Court's alternative ruling implicates a conflict in the Circuits. The Seventh Circuit has held, in line with the District Court's view here, that the statute of limitations on the entire withdrawal liability begins to run when the employer misses its first scheduled installment. Under the rule advanced by the Seventh Circuit, a plan that sues too late to recover the first payment forfeits the right to recover any of the outstanding withdrawal liability. Navco, 3 F. 3d, at 172-173. By contrast, the Third Circuit has held that each missed payment creates a separate cause of action with its own six-year limitations period. Under the rule advanced by the Third Circuit, a plaintiff who does not sue in time to recover the first payment may still recover any succeeding payments that came due within six years of the complaint. Kahle Engineering Corp., 43 F. 3d, at 857-861. We conclude that the Third Circuit's approach is the correct one. The Fund's action is therefore barred only insofar as it seeks to recover Ferbar's first $345.50 installment.
A
In briefing on the merits—but not in its petition for certiorari—the Fund argued that we need not resolve the question that has divided the Third and Seventh Circuits. We can
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