Cite as: 522 U. S. 192 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
riod on a particular payment runs from the date that payment comes due.5
Rejecting the approach we now endorse, the Seventh Circuit regarded the foregoing principles as controlling contractual obligations only. Where "the employer did not assent to a longer period for payment and suit," that court concluded, a pension fund has "only one claim against the employer"—"the amount of withdrawal liability. Although a fund may permit an employer to amortize this sum over 20 years . . . the whole amount is presumptively due at the outset." Navco, 3 F. 3d, at 172 (emphasis deleted). The Ninth Circuit appeared to entertain a similar view in this case. See 73 F. 3d, at 973, n. 4 ("Ferbar never agreed to the installment plan proposed by the Fund and made no installment payments. As a result, it appears that no new contract to pay off the withdrawal liability could have been formed.").
We cannot agree that the rule that each missed payment carries its own limitations period turns on the origin—contractual or otherwise—of an installment obligation. Courts have repeatedly applied the rule in actions to collect on installment judgments, even though such obligations obviously
5 See Board of Trustees of Dist. 15 Machinists' Pension Fund v. Kahle Engineering Corp., 43 F. 3d 852, 857 (CA3 1994) (" '[W]here there is an acceleration clause giving the creditor the right upon certain contingencies to declare the whole sum due, the statute begins to run, only with respect to each instalment, at the time the instalment becomes due, unless the creditor exercises his option to declare the whole indebtedness due, in which case the statute begins to run from the date of the exercise of his option.' ") (quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions § 133 (1970)); see also 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 951 (1951) ("[T]he creditor is not required to join subsequent instalments in his action for the first instalment, if the acceleration clause is regarded as giving him an option. In such case, the statute does not begin to run against later instalments until each falls due in regular course."). The statute of limitations on an accelerated debt runs from the date the creditor exercises its acceleration option, not earlier. Therefore, we need not consider Ferbar's contention that the Fund's complaint, which sought to recover the entire withdrawal liability, amounted to a decision to accelerate. See Brief for Respondents 39.
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