288
Opinion of O'Connor, J.
clemency or for postconviction relief—or of remaining silent. But this pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled. We therefore hold that the Ohio clemency interview, even on assumptions most favorable to respond-ent's claim, does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
IV
We hold that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is violated by Ohio's clemency proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
A prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person and consequently has an interest in his life. The question this case raises is the issue of what process is constitutionally necessary to protect that interest in the context of Ohio's clemency procedures. It is clear that "once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). I do not, however, agree with the suggestion in the principal opinion that, because clemency is committed to the discretion of the executive, the Due Process Clause provides no constitutional safeguards. The Chief Justice's reasoning rests on our decisions in Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458 (1981), and Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1 (1979). In those cases, the Court found that an inmate seeking commutation of a life sentence or discre-
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