Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998)
Opinion of Stevens, J.
tion to grant conditional liberty to convicted felons, any decision to deprive a parolee or a probationer of such conditional liberty must accord that person due process. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480-490 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 781-782 (1973). Similarly, if a State establishes postconviction proceedings, these proceedings must comport with due process.3
The interest in life that is at stake in this case warrants even greater protection than the interests in liberty at stake in those cases.4 For "death is a different kind of punishment
3 While it is true that the constitutional protections in state postconviction proceedings are less stringent than at trial or on direct review, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555-557 (1987), we have never held or suggested that the Due Process Clause does not apply to these proceedings. Indeed, Finley itself asked whether the State's postconviction proceedings comported with the "fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause." Id., at 556-557; see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 8 (1989) (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.) (" '[T]he fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the [S]tate supply a lawyer' " (quoting Finley, 481 U. S., at 557)). The Chief Justice, then, is simply wrong when he states that these cases "make clear that there is no continuum requiring varying levels of process at every . . . phase of the criminal system," ante, at 284; instead, these cases simply turned on what process is due. If there could be any question whether state postconviction proceedings are subject to due process protections, our unanimous opinion in Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 217-218 (1988), makes it clear that they are.
4 The Court has recognized the integral role that clemency proceedings play in the decision whether to deprive a person of life. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 411-417 (1993). Indeed, every one of the 38 States that has the death penalty also has clemency procedures. Ala. Const., Amdt. 38, Ala. Code § 15-18-100 (1995); Ariz. Const., Art. V, § 5, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-443, 31-445 (1996); Ark. Const., Art. VI, § 18, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-607 (1997), and § 16-93-204 (Supp. 1997); Cal. Const., Art. V, § 8, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 4800-4807 (West 1982 and Supp. 1998); Colo. Const., Art. IV, § 7, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-17-101, 16-17-102 (1997); Conn. Const., Art. IV, § 13, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-26 (1997); Del. Const., Art. VII, § 1, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 2103 (1997); Fla. Const., Art. IV, § 8, Fla. Stat. § 940.01 (1997); Ga. Const., Art. IV, § 2, ¶ 2, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 42-9- 20, 42-9-42 (1997); Idaho Const., Art. IV, § 7, Idaho Code § 20-240 (1997);
293
Page: Index Previous 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007