Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 21 (1998)

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292

OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD

Opinion of Stevens, J.

in the opposite direction in this case because respondent is contesting the State's decision to deprive him of life that he still has, rather than any conditional liberty that he desires. Thus, it is abundantly clear that respondent possesses a life interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

II

There are valid reasons for concluding that even if due process is required in clemency proceedings, only the most basic elements of fair procedure are required. Presumably a State might eliminate this aspect of capital sentencing entirely, and it unquestionably may allow the executive virtually unfettered discretion in determining the merits of appeals for mercy. Nevertheless, there are equally valid reasons for concluding that these proceedings are not entirely exempt from judicial review. I think, for example, that no one would contend that a Governor could ignore the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and use race, religion, or political affiliation as a standard for granting or denying clemency. Our cases also support the conclusion that if a State adopts a clemency procedure as an integral part of its system for finally determining whether to deprive a person of life, that procedure must comport with the Due Process Clause.

Even if a State has no constitutional obligation to grant criminal defendants a right to appeal, when it does establish appellate courts, the procedures employed by those courts must satisfy the Due Process Clause. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 396 (1985). Likewise, even if a State has no duty to authorize parole or probation, if it does exercise its discretinguished parole revocation and probation revocation cases, noting that there is a 'critical' difference between denial of a prisoner's request for initial release on parole and revocation of a parolee's conditional liberty. Id., at 9-11, quoting, inter alia, Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing,' 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975)." Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 464 (1981) (footnote omitted).

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