Cite as: 528 U. S. 320 (2000)
Opinion of Souter, J.
prior decisions apart from Beer. In Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975), the Court held that a city's territorial annexation reducing the percentage of black voters could not be recognized as a legal wrong under the effect prong of § 5, but remanded for further consideration of discriminatory purpose. The majority distinguishes Richmond as "nothing more than an ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation." Ante, at 330. But in fact, Richmond laid down no eccentric effect rule and is squarely at odds with the majority's position that only an act taken with intent to produce a forbidden effect is forbidden under the intent prong.
As to forbidden effect, the Richmond Court said this:
"As long as the ward system fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exists after the annexation, we cannot hold, without more specific legislative direction, that such an annexation is nevertheless barred by § 5. It is true that the black community, if there is racial bloc voting, will command fewer seats on the city council; and the annexation will have effected a decline
as amended, now invalidates facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects even in the absence of purposeful discrimination, and is thus no longer coextensive with our understanding of the Constitution. The effects-only standard was added after the Court made clear, after years of uncertainty, that the Constitution prohibited only purposeful discrimination, not neutral action with a disparate impact on minorities.
The Court has divided on the effect of this change on § 5. Compare id., at 484, with id., at 505-506 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). As Justice Breyer explained, that the effects prong now goes beyond the Constitution has no bearing on whether we should limit the meaning of the purpose prong, which does no more than repeat what the Constitution requires. Id., at 493-494. Both retrogressive and nonretrogressive discriminatory purposes violate the Constitution. As I have said already, I agree with Justice Breyer that there is no evidence that Congress intended to include in § 5 only part of what the Constitution prohibits. See id., at 494. The tides of constitutional interpretation have buffeted both § 2 and § 5, but have never ebbed so low as to approve of discriminatory, dilutive purpose.
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