Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 39 (2001)

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Cite as: 532 U. S. 275 (2001)

Stevens, J., dissenting

creating approach." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). But, as I have taken pains to explain, it was Congress, not the Court, that created the cause of action, and it was the Congress that later ratified the Cannon holding in 1986 and again in 1988. See 503 U. S., at 72-73.

In order to impose its own preferences as to the availability of judicial remedies, the Court today adopts a methodology that blinds itself to important evidence of congressional intent. It is one thing for the Court to ignore the import of our holding in Cannon, as the breadth of that precedent is a matter upon which reasonable jurists may differ. It is entirely another thing for the majority to ignore the reasoning of that opinion and the evidence contained therein, as those arguments and that evidence speak directly to the question at issue today. As I stated above, see n. 21, supra, Cannon carefully explained that both Title VI and Title IX were intended to benefit a particular class of individuals, that the purposes of the statutes would be furthered rather than frustrated by the implication of a private right of action, and that the legislative histories of the statutes support the conclusion that Congress intended such a right. See also Part IV, infra. Those conclusions and the evidence supporting them continue to have force today.

Similarly, if the majority is genuinely committed to deciphering congressional intent, its unwillingness to even consider evidence as to the context in which Congress legislated is perplexing. Congress does not legislate in a vacuum. As the respondents and the Government suggest, and as we have held several times, the objective manifestations of congressional intent to create a private right of action must be measured in light of the enacting Congress' expectations as to how the judiciary might evaluate the question. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U. S. 174 (1988); Merrill Lynch,

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