316
Stevens, J., dissenting
tially two reasons for its position. First, it attaches significance to the fact that the "rights-creating" language in § 601 that defines the classes protected by the statute is not repeated in § 602. Ante, at 288-289. But, of course, there was no reason to put that language in § 602 because it is perfectly obvious that the regulations authorized by § 602 must be designed to protect precisely the same people protected by § 601. Moreover, it is self-evident that, linguistic niceties notwithstanding, any statutory provision whose stated purpose is to "effectuate" the eradication of racial and ethnic discrimination has as its "focus" those individuals who, absent such legislation, would be subject to discrimination.
Second, the Court repeats the argument advanced and rejected in Cannon that the express provision of a fund cutoff remedy "suggests that Congress intended to preclude others." Ante, at 290. In Cannon, 441 U. S., at 704-708, we carefully explained why the presence of an explicit mechanism to achieve one of the statute's objectives (ensuring that federal funds are not used "to support discriminatory practices") does not preclude a conclusion that a private right of action was intended to achieve the statute's other principal objective ("to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices"). In support of our analysis, we offered policy arguments, cited evidence from the legislative history, and noted the active support of the relevant agencies. Ibid. In today's decision, the Court does not grapple
such a suit. However, once the courts have examined the statutory scheme under which the individual seeks to bring a suit and determined that a private right of action does exist, judges who seek to impose heretofore unrecognized limits on that right have a responsibility to offer reasoned arguments drawn from the text, structure, or history of that statute in order to justify such limitations. Moreover, in this case, the respondents have marshaled substantial affirmative evidence that a private right of action exists to enforce Title VI and the regulations validly promulgated thereunder. See supra, at 313. It strikes me that it aids rather than hinders their case that this evidence is already summarized in an opinion of this Court. See Cannon, 441 U. S., at 691-703.
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