Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 6 (2002)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  Next

130 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT v. RUCKER Opinion of the Court

ant's apartment unit when the tenant did not know of and had no reason to know of, the drug-related criminal activity." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-1770, pp. 165a-166a.

A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously permits the eviction of tenants who violate the lease provision, regardless of whether the tenant was personally aware of the drug activity, and that the statute is constitutional. See Rucker v. Davis, 203 F. 3d 627 (CA9 2000). An en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and affirmed the District Court's grant of the preliminary injunction. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F. 3d 1113 (2001). That court held that HUD's interpretation permitting the eviction of so-called "innocent" tenants "is inconsistent with Congressional intent and must be rejected" under the first step of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). 237 F. 3d, at 1126.

We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), 534 U. S. 813 (2001), and now reverse, holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity.

That this is so seems evident from the plain language of the statute. It provides that "[e]ach public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that . . . any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The en banc Court of Appeals thought the statute did not address "the level of personal knowledge or fault that is required for eviction." 237 F. 3d, at 1120. Yet Congress' decision not to impose any

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007