New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 21 (2002)

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Cite as: 535 U. S. 1 (2002)

Opinion of the Court

the view that the FPA was no more than a gap-closing statute. It is, however, perfectly clear that the original FPA did a good deal more than close the gap in state power identified in Attleboro. The FPA authorized federal regulation not only of wholesale sales that had been beyond the reach of state power, but also the regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state regulation. See, e. g., Attleboro, 273 U. S., at 85-86 (noting, prior to the enactment of the FPA, that States could regulate aspects of interstate wholesale sales, as long as such regulation did not directly burden interstate commerce). More importantly, as discussed above, the FPA authorized federal regulation of interstate transmissions as well as of interstate wholesale sales, and such transmissions were not of concern in Attleboro. Thus, even if Attleboro catalyzed the enactment of the FPA, Attleboro does not define the outer limits of the statute's coverage.

Furthermore, the portion of § 201(a) cited by New York concerning the preservation of existing state jurisdiction is actually consistent with Order No. 888, because unbundled interstate transmissions of electric energy have never been "subject to regulation by the States," 16 U. S. C. § 824(a). Indeed, unbundled transmissions have been a recent development. As FERC explained, at the time that the FPA was enacted, transmissions were bundled with the energy itself, and electricity was delivered to both wholesale and retail customers as a complete, bundled package. Order No. 888, at 31,639. Thus, in 1935, there was neither state nor federal regulation of what did not exist.13

13 FERC recognized this point in reaching its jurisdictional conclusion: "Rather than claiming 'new' jurisdiction, the Commission is applying the same statutory framework to a business environment in which . . . retail sales and transmission service are provided in separate transactions. . . . Because these types of products and transactions were not prevalent in the past, the jurisdictional issue before us did not arise and . . . the Commission cannot be viewed as 'disturbing' the jurisdiction of state regulators prior to and after the Attleboro case." Order No. 888-A, at 30,339-30,340.

21

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