270
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
in part and dissenting in part), which are far removed from the hardcore pornographic depictions that Congress intended to reach.
Indeed, we should be loath to construe a statute as banning film portrayals of Shakespearian tragedies, without some indication—from text or legislative history—that such a result was intended. In fact, Congress explicitly instructed that such a reading of the CPPA would be wholly unwarranted. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has observed:
"[T]he legislative record, which makes plain that the [CPPA] was intended to target only a narrow class of images—visual depictions 'which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual conduct.' " United States v. Hilton, 167 F. 3d 61, 72 (1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, pt. I, p. 7 (1996)).
Judge Ferguson similarly observed in his dissent in the Court of Appeals in this case:
"From reading the legislative history, it becomes clear that the CPPA merely extends the existing prohibitions on 'real' child pornography to a narrow class of computer-generated pictures easily mistaken for real photographs of real children." Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F. 3d 1083, 1102 (CA9 1999).
See also S. Rep. No. 104-358, pt. IV(C), at 21 ("[The CPPA] does not, and is not intended to, apply to a depiction produced using adults engaging i[n] sexually explicit conduct, even where a depicted individual may appear to be a minor" (emphasis in original)); id., pt. I, at 7 ("[The CPPA] addresses the problem of 'high-tech kiddie porn' "). We have looked to legislative history to limit the scope of child pornography statutes in the past, United States v.
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