Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 8 (2002)

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Opinion of the Court

When Rush failed to provide the independent review, Moran sued in an Illinois state court to compel compliance with the state Act. Rush removed the suit to Federal District Court, arguing that the cause of action was "completely preempted" under ERISA. 230 F. 3d, at 964.

While the suit was pending, Moran had surgery by Dr. Terzis at her own expense and submitted a $94,841.27 reimbursement claim to Rush. Rush treated the claim as a renewed request for benefits and began a new inquiry to determine coverage. The three doctors consulted by Rush said the surgery had been medically unnecessary.

Meanwhile, the federal court remanded the case back to state court on Moran's motion, concluding that because Moran's request for independent review under 4-10 would not require interpretation of the terms of an ERISA plan, the claim was not "completely preempted" so as to permit removal under 28 U. S. C. 1441.2 230 F. 3d, at 964. The state court enforced the state statute and ordered Rush to submit to review by an independent physician. The doctor selected was a reconstructive surgeon at Johns Hopkins Medical Center, Dr. A. Lee Dellon. Dr. Dellon decided that Dr. Terzis's treatment had been medically necessary, based on the definition of medical necessity in Rush's Certificate of

tional usage of that term, but instead is likely to encompass a variety of different structures (although Illinois does distinguish HMOs from pure insurers by regulating "traditional" health insurance in a different portion of its insurance laws, 215 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5 (2000)). Except where otherwise indicated, we use the term "HMO" because that is the term used by the State and the parties; what we intend is simply to describe the structures covered by the Illinois Act.

2 In light of our holding today that 4-10 is not preempted by ERISA, the propriety of this ruling is questionable; a suit to compel compliance with 4-10 in the context of an ERISA plan would seem to be akin to a suit to compel compliance with the terms of a plan under 29 U. S. C. 1132(a)(3). Alternatively, the proper course may have been to bring a suit to recover benefits due, alleging that the denial was improper in the absence of compliance with 4-10. We need not resolve today which of these options is more consonant with ERISA.

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