Cite as: 537 U. S. 371 (2003)
Syllabus
"current maintenance" within the meaning of the regulations. That the State is dealing with the funds consistently with the regulations is confirmed by the POMS. The Government has gone even further to support this as a reasonable interpretation, text aside, owing to significant advantages of the reimbursement method in providing accurate documentation and allowing for easy monitoring of representative payees in administering Social Security. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U. S. 413, and Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U. S. 395 (per curiam), distinguished. Pp. 382-389.
(b) The Court rejects the view that this construction of § 407(a), allowing a state agency to reimburse itself for foster care costs, is antithetical to the child's best interests. Respondents' premise that promoting those interests requires maximizing resources from left-over benefit income ignores the settled administrative law principle that an open-ended and potentially vague term is highly susceptible to administrative interpretation subject to judicial deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843. Under her statutory authority, the Commissioner has read the beneficiary's "interest" in light of the Act's basic objectives: to provide a minimum level of income to children who would not otherwise have sufficient resources, see, e. g., Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521, 524, and to provide workers and their families the income required for ordinary and necessary living expenses, see, e. g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 50. The Commissioner, that is, has decided that a representative payee serves the beneficiary's interest by seeing that basic needs are met, not by maximizing a trust fund attributable to fortuitously overlapping state and federal grants. This judgment not only is obviously within reasonable bounds, but is confirmed by the demonstrably antithetical character of respondents' position to the best interest of many foster care children. If respondents prevailed, many foster children would lose SSI benefits altogether, since eligibility for such benefits is lost if a child's resources creep above a certain minimal level, currently $2,000. E. g., 20 CFR § 416.1205(c). In addition, respondents' argument forgets that public institutions like the department are last in line for appointment as representative payees. If respondents had their way, public offices might well not be there to serve as payees even as the last resort, because many States would be discouraged from accepting appointment as representative payees by the administrative costs of acting in that capacity. With a smaller total pool of money for their potential use, the chances of having funds for genuine needs beyond immediate support would obviously shrink, to the children's loss. Pp. 389-391.
145 Wash. 2d 1, 32 P. 3d 267, reversed and remanded.
373
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