McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 109 (2003)

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208

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." 424 U. S., at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One might just as well argue that the electioneering communication definition is underinclusive because it leaves advertising 61 days in advance of an election entirely unregulated. The record amply justifies Congress' line-drawing.

In addition to arguing that § 316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive, some plaintiffs contend that it unconstitutionally discriminates in favor of media companies. FECA § 304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes from the definition of electioneering communications any "communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate." 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. II). Plaintiffs argue this provision gives free rein to media companies to engage in speech without resort to PAC money. Section 304(f)(3)(B)(i)'s effect, however, is much narrower than plaintiffs suggest. The provision excepts news items and commentary only; it does not afford carte blanche to media companies generally to ignore FECA's provisions. The statute's narrow exception is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles. "A valid distinction . . . exists between corporations that are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public." Austin, 494 U. S., at 668. Numerous federal statutes have drawn this distinction to ensure that the law "does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events." Ibid. (citations omitted); see, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (exempting news stories, commentaries, and editorials from FECA's definition of "expenditure"); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1801-1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption for newspapers); 47 U. S. C. § 315(a) (excepting newscasts, news

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