McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 111 (2003)

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210

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

quired such corporations, like business corporations, to pay for their express advocacy from segregated funds rather than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 (2003), confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a subcategory of corporations described as "MCFL organizations," as defined by our decision in MCFL, 479 U. S. 238 (1986).91 The constitutional objection to applying FECA's segregated-fund requirement to so-called MCFL organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA § 316(c)(6).

Our decision in MCFL related to a carefully defined category of entities. We identified three features of the organization at issue in that case that were central to our holding:

"First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political resources reflect political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with

electioneering communications. The parties and the judges on the District Court have assumed that amended FECA § 316(c)(6) completely canceled the exemption for nonprofit corporations set forth in § 316(c)(2). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) ("Section 204 completely cancels out the exemption for all nonprofit corporations provided by Section 203").

91 "[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation's sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at 201-202. There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here." Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 163.

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