Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace." Id., at 264.
That FECA § 316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire section. If a reasonable limiting construction "has been or could be placed on the challenged statute" to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it. Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 613; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44. Because our decision in the MCFL case was on the books for many years before BCRA was enacted, we presume that the legislators who drafted § 316(c)(6) were fully aware that the provision could not validly apply to MCFL-type entities. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 896 (1988); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979). Indeed, the Government itself concedes that § 316(c)(6) does not apply to MCFL organizations. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 661-665 (holding that a segregated-fund requirement that did not explicitly carve out an MCFL exception could apply to a nonprofit corporation that did not qualify for MCFL status).
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court upholding § 316(c)(6) as so limited is affirmed.
BCRA § 212's Reporting Requirement for $1,000 Expenditures
Section 212 of BCRA amends FECA § 304 to add a new disclosure requirement, FECA § 304(g), which applies to persons making independent expenditures of $1,000 or more during the 20-day period immediately preceding an election.
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