McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 173 (2003)

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272

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Thomas, J.

donors show support for both parties. This commonsense explanation surely belies the joint opinion's too-hasty conclusion drawn from a relatively innocent fact.

The Court today finds such sparse evidence sufficient. This cannot be held to satisfy even the "relatively complaisant review" of Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161, unless, as it appears, the Court intends to abdicate entirely its role.5

II

The Court is not content with "balanc[ing] away First Amendment freedoms," Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting), in the context of the restrictions imposed by Title I, which could arguably (if wrongly) be thought to be mere contribution limits. The Court also, in upholding virtually all of Title II, proceeds to do the same for limitations on expenditures, which constitute "political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,' " Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968)). Today's holding continues a disturbing trend: the steady decrease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political speech. See Buckley, supra, at 16 (First Amendment requires "exacting scrutiny"); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387 (applying "Buckley's standard of scrutiny"); Beaumont, supra, at 161 (referencing "relatively complaisant review").6 Although this trend is most obvious in the review of contribution limits, it has now reached what even this Court today would presumably recognize as a direct restriction on core political speech: limitations on independent expenditures.

5 Because there is not an iota of evidence supporting the Government's asserted interests in BCRA § 318, I concur in the Court's conclusion that this provision is unconstitutional.

6 The joint opinion continues yet another disturbing trend: the application of a complaisant level of scrutiny under the guise of "strict scrutiny." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003).

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