Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
The right to anonymous speech cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the defendants. I would thus hold that the disclosure requirements of BCRA § 201 are unconstitutional. Because of this conclusion, the so-called advance disclosure requirement of § 201 necessarily falls as well.10
D
I have long maintained that Buckley was incorrectly decided and should be overturned. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 465; Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410; Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 640. But, most of Title II should still be held unconstitutional even under the Buckley framework. Under Buckley and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), it is, or at least was, clear that any regulation of political speech beyond communications using words of express advocacy is unconstitutional. Hence, even under the joint opinion's framework, most of Title II is unconstitutional, as both the "primary definition" and "backup definition" of "electioneer-10 BCRA § 212(a) is also unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs only challenge the advance disclosure requirement of § 212(a), by requiring disclosure of communications using express advocacy, the entire reporting requirement is unconstitutional for the same reasons that § 201 is unconstitutional. Consequently, it follows that the advance disclosure provision is unconstitutional.
BCRA §§ 311 and 504 also violate the First Amendment. By requiring any television or radio advertisement that satisfies the definition of "electioneering communication" to include the identity of the sponsor, and even a "full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or other person making the statement" in the case of a television advertisement, new FECA § 318, § 311 is a virtual carbon copy of the law at issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995) (the only difference being the irrelevant distinction between a printed pamphlet and a television or radio advertisement). And § 504 not only has the precise flaws of § 201, but also sweeps broadly as well, covering any "message relating to any political matter of national importance, including . . . a national legislative issue of public importance." Hence, both §§ 311 and 504 should be struck down.
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