McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 175 (2003)

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274

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Thomas, J.

mense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." The only effect, however, that the "immense aggregations" of wealth will have (in the context of independent expenditures) on an election is that they might be used to fund communications to convince voters to select certain candidates over others. In other words, the "corrosive and distorting effects" described in Austin are that corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, will be able to convince voters of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently, winning in the marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that "the ultimate good" has been "reached by free trade in ideas," or that the speaker has survived "the best test of truth" by having "the thought . . . get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams, 250 U. S., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). It is now evidence of "corruption." This conclusion is antithetical to everything for which the First Amendment stands. See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it"); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959) ("[I]n the realm of ideas [the Constitution] protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing").

Because Austin's definition of "corruption" is incompatible with the First Amendment, I would overturn Austin and hold that the potential for corporations and unions to influence voters, via independent expenditures aimed at convincing these voters to adopt particular views, is not a form of corruption justifying any state regulation or suppression. Without Austin's peculiar variation of "corruption," §§ 203 and 204 are supported by no compelling government interest. The joint opinion does not even argue that these provi-

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