Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
the Court has adopted to date permits outlawing speech on the ground that it might influence an election, which might lead to greater access to politicians by the sponsoring organization, which might lead to actual corruption or the appearance of corruption. Settled law requires a real and close connection between end and means. The attenuated causation the majority endorses today is antithetical to the concept of narrow tailoring. 3.
As I would invalidate § 203 under the primary definition, it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provision. As applied in § 203, the backup definition prohibits corporations and unions from financing from their general treasury funds
"any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. II).
The prohibition under the backup has much of the same imprecision as the ban under the primary definition, though here there is even more overbreadth. Unlike the primary definition, the backup contains no temporal or geographic limitation. Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communications—not just those aired within a certain blackout period and received by a certain segment of the population—are prohibited, provided they "promote," "support," "attack," or "oppose" a candidate. There is no showing that such a permanent and ubiquitous restriction meets First Amendment standards for the relationship between means and ends.
The backup definition is flawed for the further reason that it is vague. The crucial words—"promote," "support," "at-
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